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Abstract
As technology advances towards more connected and digital environments, medical devices are becoming increasingly
connected to hospital networks and to the Internet, which exposes them, and thus the patients using them, to new
cybersecurity threats. Currently, there is a lack of a methodology dedicated to information security risk assessment for
medical devices.
In this study, we present the Threat identification, ontology-based Likelihood, severity Decomposition, and Risk inte-
gration (TLDR) methodology for information security risk assessment for medical devices. The TLDR methodology uses
the following steps: (1) identifying the potentially vulnerable components of medical devices, in this case, four different
medical imaging devices (MIDs); (2) identifying the potential attacks, in this case, 23 potential attacks on MIDs; (3) map-
ping the discovered attacks into a known attack ontology — in this case, the Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and
Classifications (CAPECs); (4) estimating the likelihood of the mapped CAPECs in the medical domain with the assis-
tance of a panel of senior healthcare Information Security Experts (ISEs); (5) computing the CAPEC-based likelihood
estimates of each attack; (6) decomposing each attack into several severity aspects and assigning them weights ; (7) as-
sessing the magnitude of the impact of each of the severity aspects for each attack with the assistance of a panel of senior
Medical Experts (MEs); (8) computing the composite severity assessments for each attack; and finally, (9) integrating the
likelihood and severity of each attack into its risk, and thus prioritizing it. The details of steps six to eight are beyond
the scope of the current study; in the current study, we had replaced them by a single step that included asking the
panel of MEs [in this case, radiologists], to assess the overall severity for each attack and use it as its severity.
We have demonstrated that using the TLDR methodology, healthcare ISEs can reach a form of a consensus regarding
the likelihood estimates of cyber attacks and CAPECs while maintaining the validity of the risk assessments’ absolute
values. To show this, we asked the ISEs to estimate also the direct overall likelihood for each attack individually. We
demonstrated the value and the validity of using the TLDR methodology with respect to the relative ranking of the
23 potential threats, by calculating the pairwise Spearman’s correlation between the CAPEC-based likelihood estimates
and the direct estimates of each of our ISEs, and showing that the correlation is high, while the pairwise correlation
between the mean of the direct estimates and each of the ISEs’ overall direct estimates was lower. We also calculated
the paired T -test statistic between the CAPEC-based estimates and the direct ISEs’ estimates, and showed that the
null hypothesis is accepted (i.e., there was no significant difference between them). This implies that the CAPEC-based
likelihood estimates, using the TLDRmethodology, are as valid as current direct risk assessment methodologies’ likelihood
estimates; however, the CAPEC-based likelihood estimates are much easier to calculate.
With the TLDR methodology, members of the healthcare industry who provide the severity assessments are likely to
be more aware of the implications of these potential risks, might be able to address them more efficiently, and might be
better positioned to prioritize the protection efforts for MIDs and for multiple other medical devices and ecosystems to
which the TLDR methodology can be applied. In addition, mapping all potential medical devices attacks into a small
number of CAPECs, as we had demonstrated comprehensively in the case of MIDs, facilitates the acquisition of their
likelihoods from ISEs and the computation of the CAPEC-based likelihood estimates for each attack, and thus, also, of
its risk.
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1. Introduction
As part of the rapid development of medical device tech-
nology, medical devices are becoming increasingly con-
nected to hospital networks and even to the Internet, in-
cluding many devices that have become critical resources
in healthcare organizations, such as medical imaging de-
vices (MIDs). Consequently, medical devices today are
facing new cyber security threats which include: (1) an in-
creasing potential attack surface due to connection to hos-
pital networks and the Internet; (2) a rising number of out-
dated and unpatched devices, for which known vulnerabil-
ities that can be easily exploited already exist; (3) ongoing
difficulty in updating the devices’ software, due to strict
regulations which takes too long to comply with (certifica-
tion was typically given only to the device that included
the original hardware and software); (4) lack of aware-
ness and insufficient investment in security among med-
ical device manufacturers, regulatory authorities, health-
care personnel, and patients; and (5) increasing interest in
the healthcare industry by cyber warfare’s leading players
due to the potential high revenue of this domain (e.g., ran-
somware of expensive or life-supporting devices, or black
market trade of highly-priced patients medical records).
Such threats are no longer just the imagination of
William Gibson’s science fiction stories1. In May 2017, the
WannaCry ransomware attack [2–4] spread worldwide, in-
fecting over 200,000 devices in more than 150 countries [5],
including tens of thousands of the UK’s National Health
Service (NHS) hospitals’ devices [6] and MIDs [7], causing
them to be non-operational by encrypting them. This at-
tack caused several hospitals to turn away patients [8, 9]
and divert ambulance routes [10] (see appendix § Appendix
A for more details). A year earlier, in February 2016, the
Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center in Los Angeles was
hit by another ransomware attack [11, 12], potentially re-
lated to the Locky ransomware [13], which seized control
of the hospital’s computer system and encrypted all of its
files; the Guardian [14] reported that “the hospital attack-
ers are demanding a ransom of B9,000 Bitcoin (about $3.6
million [at that time]) to decrypt the files”, and the hospi-
tal eventually “paid a $17,000 ransom” to release the files,
as reported by the Los Angeles Times [15]. These exam-
ples demonstrate the high financial motivation of criminals
to target critical healthcare infrastructure, such as MIDs.
Furthermore, medical devices, such as MIDs and radia-
tion therapy medical devices, could be used maliciously to
cause physical harm to patients due to the use of power-
ful ionizing radiation, strong magnets, gamma radiation,
etc. To date, there have been no reports of cyber attacks
that caused such physical harm to patients; however, the
Therac-25 incident teaches us that this scenario is indeed
1A science fiction writer that notably coined the term cyberspace
in his short story Burning Chrome (1982) [1] and made it famous in
his ground-breaking novel, Neuromancer (1984).
possible. Therac-25 was a radiation therapy medical de-
vice for the treatment of cancer, designed by the AECL2;
this device was involved with several incidents of radiation
overdose in 1985-1987, which Leveson and Turner [16] re-
viewed. The device’s software contained dangerous vulner-
abilities associated with improper safety interlock imple-
mentations, which were implemented by software instead
of hardware. These vulnerabilities enabled a race condi-
tion to occur in certain situations, resulting in patients
receiving massive amounts of direct radiation, sometimes
a hundred times more than the usual dose. The incident
involved at least six patients that suffered severe radiation
burns and paralysis of different areas of the body (e.g.,
hands, legs, and vocal cords), neurogenic bowel and blad-
der, disorientation, coma, and even death. As far as we
know, this incident was not the result of a cyber attack
per se; nevertheless, it demonstrates the potential risks of
these devices if they are compromised.
Today, reports on cyber attacks and adversarial events
targeting medical devices such as MIDs are still not fre-
quent, possibly due to the lack of incentives, lack of fed-
eral safe harbor policies, lack of clear, actionable guidance,
and lack of meaningful and convenient reporting mech-
anisms [17]. A publication by Ayala [18] provides gen-
eral information regarding the security of medical devices,
briefly describing several potential attacks. While this is
an important initial step towards raising awareness about
the security of medical devices, it lacks a methodology for
information security risk assessment of these threats.
The International Organization for Standardization
(ISO) defines information security risk assessment as the:
“process to comprehend the nature of risk and to de-
termine the level of risk, [providing] the basis for risk
evaluation and decisions about risk treatment [including]
risk estimation. . . ” [19]. Risk assessment is usually the
main part of an overall risk management strategy, which
also includes control measures of mitigating the potential
risks [20, 21]. The HIPAA3, the US legislation for security
and privacy of medical information, requires healthcare or-
ganizations to “conduct an accurate and thorough assess-
ment of the potential risks and vulnerabilities to the con-
fidentiality, integrity, and availability of electronically pro-
tected health information held by the [organization].” [22]
(HIPAA § 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(A)). Note that HIPAA does
not require the use of a specific information security risk
assessment methodology (see § 164.316(b)(1) [22]). Conse-
quently, many chief information security officers (CISOs)
in health maintenance organizations (HMOs) are using
common risk assessment methods, which are designed to
protect the patients’ information rather than the patients’
well-being.
Therefore, there is a need for a new methodology for in-
formation security risk assessment for medical devices. We
believe that the application of the new information security
2Atomic Energy of Canada Limited
3Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
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risk assessment methodology we are proposing, the Threat
identification, ontology-based Likelihood, severity Decom-
position, and Risk integration (TLDR) methodology, to
MIDs, and perhaps to additional medical devices in the
future, will pave the way for future research of medical de-
vices security and lead to the development of more secure
medical devices.
The main contributions of this study are:
• We present the essential background for our study,
including the current state-of-the-art medical devices
security and the security challenges for the healthcare
industry.
• We present the TLDR methodology for information
security risk assessment for medical devices, which in-
cludes: (1) identifying the potentially vulnerable com-
ponents of medical devices using Attack Flow Dia-
grams (AFDs); (2) identifying the potential attacks
and marking them on the AFDs; (3) mapping the dis-
covered attacks into their relevant Common Attack
Pattern Enumeration and Classifications (CAPECs);
(4) estimating the likelihood of the mapped CAPECs
in the medical domain, with the assistance of a
panel of senior healthcare Information Security Ex-
perts (ISEs); (5) computing the CAPEC-based like-
lihood estimates for each attack, using the mean of
the ISEs’ likelihood estimates of the CAPECs into
which the attack is mapped; (6) decomposing each at-
tack into several severity aspects and assigning them
weights ; (7) assessing the magnitude of the impact
of each of the severity aspects for each attack, with
the assistance of a panel of Medical Experts (MEs);
(8) computing the composite severity assessments for
each attack; and finally, (9) integrating the likelihood
and severity of each attack into its risk, and thus pri-
oritizing it.
The details of steps six to eight are beyond the scope
of the current study and are a part of another study.
• We present the application of the TLDR methodology
to MIDs:
– We identified the potentially vulnerable com-
ponents of MIDs by creating four AFDs for
the generic MID, a generic computed tomogra-
phy (CT), a generic magnetic resonance imaging
(MRI), and a generic ultrasound;
– we identified a total of 23 potential attacks on
MIDs: 15 known attacks and eight new attacks
that we discovered using the AFDs;
– We mapped of all 23 discovered attacks to just
eight out of 517 existing CAPEC, and a new,
518th, CAPEC attack pattern that we suggest
adding;
– We estimated the likelihood of the nine generic
CAPECs with the assistance of our panel of four
senior healthcare ISEs and used these estimates
to compute the CAPEC-based likelihood esti-
mates of each attack;
– We assessed, for all medical device attacks, the
overall severity of each attack4 with the assis-
tance of a panel of four senior MEs [in this case,
radiologists]; and finally,
– We integrated the likelihood and severity of each
attack into its risk and prioritized the attacks.
• We demonstrated that by using the TLDR method-
ology, ISEs could reach a [mean] consensus on the
relative ranking of the CAPEC-based likelihood esti-
mates of the different attacks, while also maintaining
the validity of the risk assessments’ absolute values.
To show this, we asked the ISEs to estimate also the di-
rect overall likelihood for each attack individually. We
then defined two “consensus” vectors of the 23 poten-
tial attacks: (1) the Mean of the Experts’ CAPEC-Based
Likelihood Estimates (MECBLE) (computed indirectly),
and (2) the Mean of the Experts’ Direct-Likelihood Es-
timates (MEDLE). We demonstrated the value and the
validity of using the TLDR methodology with respect to
the relative ranking of the 23 potential threats, by cal-
culating the pairwise Spearman’s correlation between the
CAPEC-based (Mean of the Experts’ CAPEC-Based Like-
lihood Estimates (MECBLE)) likelihood estimates and the
direct estimates of each of our ISEs, and showing that the
correlation is high, while the pairwise correlation between
the mean of the direct estimates (the Mean of the Experts’
Direct-Likelihood Estimates (MEDLE)) and each of the
ISEs’ overall direct estimates was lower. We also demon-
strated that we maintain the validity of the risk assessment
process, by calculating the paired T -test statistic between
the CAPEC-based (MECBLE) estimates and the direct
ISEs’ estimates, and showing that the null hypothesis is
accepted (i.e., there was no significant difference between
them). This implies that the CAPEC-based (MECBLE)
likelihood estimates, using the TLDR methodology, are as
valid as current direct risk assessment methodologies’ like-
lihood estimates; however, the CAPEC-based likelihood
estimates, computed from the mapped CAPECs, are much
easier to calculate.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. First, we
provide the essential background (§ 2) for this study, on
medical devices security (§ 2.1), information security risk
assessment methodologies (§ 2.2), CAPEC mechanism of
attack (§ 2.3), and MIDs (§ 2.4). We then present the
TLDR methodology for information security risk assess-
ment for medical devices and the evaluation methods of
the TLDR methodology (§ 3). We then present the re-
sults (§ 4) of the application of the TLDR methodology to
MIDs and the validation of its correctness, with a panel of
four healthcare ISEs. The TLDR composite severity as-
sessment part of the TLDR methodology, which includes
4Note that this single simple step would usually include steps 3.6
to 3.8 of the TLDR methodology; however, these steps and their
validation are beyond the scope of the current study and are a part
of another study.
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severity decomposition into severity aspects, its assess-
ment, and its validation, is beyond the scope of the cur-
rent study and will be discussed in a separate paper that
we are preparing. Finally, we summarize our study (§ 5),
discuss the implications of our results (§ 6), and conclude
the study (§ 8). The following supplementary informa-
tion is provided in the appendices: a description of the
WannaCry attack (§ Appendix A), and a list of abbrevi-
ations (§ Appendix B).
2. Background
In this section, we present some essential background
for our study. We first discuss the current state of the art
of medical devices security (§ 2.1) and stress why MIDs
are particularly vulnerable. Following that, we briefly de-
scribe currently used information security risk assessment
methodologies and define how to calculate the risk of an
attack (§ 2.2). We then present the CAPEC mechanism of
attack (§ 2.3), which we use in the TLDR methodology in
the next section (§ 3). Finally, we present a background
on MIDs (§ 2.4).
2.1. Medical Device Security
Medical devices are in the process of evolving from ana-
log, standalone, disconnected from the outside world, de-
vices to sophisticated devices with advanced computing
and communication capabilities, such as local area net-
work and wireless connectivity, and, in extreme cases, even
public cloud connectivity [23]. Whereas these technology
advancements have many benefits (e.g., improved patient
care), they also poses numerous security vulnerabilities
that could be exploited by attackers to create dangerous
scenarios for patients such as disabling the device and its
services (e.g., ransomware), disrupting the device’s proper
operation and resources (e.g., battery depletion), tamper-
ing with the private data stored and transmitted by the
device, etc. Furthermore, wired and wireless connectiv-
ity enables remote attacks that do not even require the
attackers to be physically close to the targeted device or
connected to hospital networks [24].
For example, by disabling or reprogramming thera-
pies delivered by implanted devices, such as an im-
plantable-cardioverter defibrillator (ICD) with wireless
connectivity [25], researchers were able to induce a shock
to the ICD capable of causing ventricular fibrillation (i.e.,
a fatal heart rhythm) [26] and cause depletion of the bat-
tery, rendering the device inoperative [27] and resulting
in a situation in which the patient necessitated a surgi-
cal procedure to replace the device. Such risks led former
US vice president Dick Cheney to disable the wireless ca-
pabilities on his ICD in 2007 to avoid being targeted by
terrorists [28]. Currently, nothing prevents such remote
attacks from finding their way into MIDs as well.
Today, cyber warfare’s leading players are groups of cy-
ber terrorists and hacktivists (i.e., politically-driven), cy-
ber criminals (i.e., profit-driven), and nation-state sup-
ported attackers (i.e., militarily-driven), which do not tar-
get information technology (IT) systems exclusively but
also target critical infrastructure industries, such as man-
ufacturing, financial services, transportation, government,
and healthcare. According to the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration (FDA): “cyber actors will likely increase cyber in-
trusions against health care systems — to include medical
devices. . . ” [29]. In January 2016, the VHA5 reported [30]
blocking more than 76 million intrusion attempts, over 638
million malware-based attacks, more than 99 million mali-
cious emails, and three infected medical devices — in just
one month [31]. Hence, it is expected that in the near fu-
ture, cyber attacks targeting the healthcare industry will
become more frequent, more sophisticated, and more dan-
gerous.
MIDs are particularly vulnerable and attractive targets
to cyber attacks since they are: (1) connected to hospital
networks and in many cases to the Internet, increasing the
potential attack surface of attackers; (2) considered criti-
cal resources in the healthcare industry, widely used and
depended upon in all aspects of health care, from diag-
noses of patients’ medical conditions to guiding physicians
during surgery; (3) very expensive and thus many hospi-
tals can only procure a few MIDs, making then an even
more critical resource; (4) very complex, often consisting
of an entire ecosystem of components, making the cost of
a single MID extremely high; (5) storing and accessing
patients’ private medical data, exposing them to privacy
associated risks (e.g., leakage of confidential data); and
(6) accompanied by risks to patients’ physical health (e.g.,
radiation exposure).
A recent paper, Ferrara [32] surveyed cybersecurity in
medical imaging and reached similar conclusions. In his
paper, Ferrara emphasizes that healthcare organizations
are not expected to be completely resistant to cyber at-
tacks; however, they should consider carefully how to man-
age and mitigate risks. In the next section, we discuss cur-
rently used information security risk assessment method-
ologies and why there is a need for a new information se-
curity risk assessment methodology for medical devices.
2.2. Information Security Risk Assessment Methodologies
Fenz et al. [33] reviewed commonly used risk assessment
methods including the NIST-SP6 800-30 [34], the ISO/IEC
27005 [35] by the ISO and the IEC7, the OCTAVE8 [36],
CRAMM9, by the UK CCTA10 [37, 38], the FAIR11 [39],
5Veterans Health Administration, an entity encompassing hospi-
tals and facilities for US war veterans, serving more than 20 million
veterans.
6National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publica-
tion
7International Electrotechnical Commission
8Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evalua-
tion
9CCTA Risk Analysis and Management Method
10Central Computer and Telecommunications Agency
11Factor Analysis of Information Risk
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and the ISAMM12 [40]. We found that these methods
usually consists of the following steps: (1) definition of the
potentially vulnerable assets of the organization, (2) iden-
tification of the potential threats to these assets, (3) esti-
mation of the likelihood of the identified threats to occur,
(4) assessment of the severity (or impact) of the identi-
fied threats if occurred, (5) integration of the risk of the
identified threats using the likelihood and severity, and
(6) prioritization of threats based on the risk.
A conventional method for integrating the risk of po-
tential threats, which we found to appear in most risk
assessment methodologies such as those listed above, can
be simply defined as follows:
Definition 2.1 (Risk). Risk of a threat (e.g., cyber at-
tack) is a function Risk : Likelihood× Severity → Risk,
defined in Equation (1):
Risk = Likelihood · Severity (1)
Where Likelihood represents the probability of the occur-
rence of the threat, and Severity represents the potential
impact of the threat.
Remark 1. The Severity is usually decomposed into con-
fidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) aspects.
Remark 2. Although economists and decision analysts use
other methods, it is common in the information security
community, in which knowledge of likelihoods and impacts
is often scarce, to estimate the Likelihood probability and
the Severity qualitatively (e.g., using a zero to five scale).
In 2017, Stine et al. [41] proposed a risk scoring system
specifically designed for medical devices. Their methodol-
ogy focuses on decomposing the severity of each attack into
five aspects: loss or denial of view, loss or denial of con-
trol, manipulation of view, manipulation of control, and
denial or manipulation of safety, and qualitatively estimat-
ing them. The likelihood of each attack, in their method-
ology, was fixed to a probability of 1, which the authors
justified by following the FDA post-market guidance of us-
ing a naive worst-case estimate in the absence of adequate
probability data [42]
In 2019, Yasqoob et al. [43] proposed an integrated
safety, security, and privacy risk assessment framework
for medical devices. In their methodology, the authors
calculate the risk of specific vulnerabilities based on the
CWE13 database of CVE14. They present a non-straight-
forward approach for estimating the likelihood of CVEs
as expanding the traditional CIA, adding a fourth “safety”
aspect.
While these methodologies represent important at-
tempts to consider aspects that are specifically designed
for medical devices with a human-machine interface, which
12Information Security Assessment & Monitoring Method
13Common Weaknesses Enumeration
14Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
most previously mentioned risk assessment methods (that
decomposed the severity to only three CIA aspects) lacked
— they are not complete. Stine’s method lacks an estima-
tion of likelihood. Yasqoob’s method is designed for only
estimating CVEs’ risks, while attacks usually consist of
several CVEs; thus, it is not clear how to estimate the
risk of sophisticated attacks. The results of both meth-
ods were not statistically validated. Nevertheless, these
methodologies demonstrate the unique requirements of an
information security risk assessment for medical devices in
the healthcare industry and strengthen our understanding
that a complete and more reasonably accurate means are
necessary.
2.3. CAPEC: Mechanisms of Attack
The mechanisms of attacks we describe in this study
are essentially the attack patterns, which define how the
attacks are performed. Attack patterns can be classified
using the Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Clas-
sification (CAPEC) taxonomy by the MITRE Corpora-
tion [44], which already includes 517 different attack pat-
terns well-organized, well-reviewed, and confirmed by the
community.
The CAPEC hierarchy is divided into different levels of
abstraction: (1) category, a collection of attack patterns
based on some common characteristic; (2) meta attack pat-
tern, an abstract characterization of a technique used in
an attack; and (3) standard attack pattern, a specific tech-
nique used in an attack. Furthermore, many of the attack
patterns in CAPEC also include additional useful infor-
mation, such as:
1. Summary description: a standard description of the
attack pattern that defines the weakness of the attack
target and the steps performed by the attacker.
2. Attack prerequisites: the necessary conditions for the
attack to succeed.
3. Attack severity: range from one (i.e., very low) to five
(i.e., very high).
4. Likelihood of attack success: the probability of an
attack to succeed, considering target vulnerabilities,
prerequisites, required skills, required resources, and
the effectiveness of potential mitigation, range from
one (i.e., very low) to five (i.e., very high).
5. Methods of attack : the attack vectors that identify
the mechanisms used in the attack (e.g., brute force).
6. Specific knowledge or skill required to conduct attack :
the specific knowledge or skill required by an attacker
to perform the attack, including an indication of the
level of knowledge or skill required from 1 to 3.
7. Potential solutions or mitigation: any action or ap-
proach that may prevent the attack, reduce the prob-
ability, reduce the impact, or mitigate the effects of
the attack.
Thus, if we can map attacks on medical devices into
CAPEC attack patterns, we will be able to infer the rel-
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evant information from CAPEC and apply it to these at-
tacks (e.g., potential solutions or mitigation options, which
will already exist within the CAPEC attack pattern), or
at least use such information as a good starting point.
2.4. Medical Imaging Devices (MIDs)
Medical imaging is a broad field associated with creat-
ing a visual representation of the human body and internal
tissues, using advanced technologies to diagnose, monitor,
treat, manage, or study medical conditions [45]. Differ-
ent imaging technologies produce different results regard-
ing the area of the body being inspected or treated; thus,
medical imaging provides physicians with a vast amount
of information about patients’ medical conditions and the
effectiveness of medical treatment [46]. Medical imaging
is used extensively throughout the healthcare system and
patient lifespan, from prenatal imaging to geriatrics, en-
compassing personal imaging to population imaging, emer-
gency care to chronic care, and treatment of various pa-
tients such as oncologic patients.
MIDs are composed of very sophisticated detectors that
can measure the effects of various signals which are used
to produce medical images. The type of equipment used
in each MID is referred to as the modality, and the type
of signal depends on the modality. Unlike regular cam-
eras (e.g., digital cameras), MIDs do not usually detect
visible light. Instead, they detect other signals, such as
magnetic field resonance, X-rays, gamma rays, ultrasonic
waves, etc., which reveal the internal structures of the hu-
man body. Each type of signal affects various tissues dif-
ferently, providing diverse information about the area of
the body being studied or treated; this information can be
related to possible disease, injury, or the effectiveness of
medical treatment.
MIDs can measure the effects of signals produced by
the MID itself or signals transmitted naturally from the
patient or preinjected material. The latter can be done in
most imaging exams by using substances that absorb or
change the signals produced by the MID, or, by particular
radiation-emitting substances that are injected into the pa-
tient’s body before the scan. Also, intravenous injections
of iodinated contrast are often used for enhanced anatom-
ical and functional assessment of various organs [47]. The
FDA has indicated that this exposes patients to potential
risks associated with possible reactions to the agent [48].
Figure 1 presents the main MIDs currently used by
healthcare facilities worldwide. Each modality has its ap-
plications and technology: X-rays are used in CT, radio
frequency (RF) is used in MRI [49], gamma rays are used
in nuclear medicine, and high-frequency sound waves are
used in ultrasound. In the context of patient safety, a
property shared by all modalities is the trade-off between
the power of the projected energy, emitted by the device or
modality, and its impact on patient safety and the quality
of the image: a high X-ray dose, long magnetic resonance
time, or high ultrasound power may improve the quality
of the image; however, it may damage the tissue being
scanned and harm the patient. The cost of MIDs and
their technologies range from a few thousand dollars (e.g.,
ultrasound) to a few million dollars.
Medical Imaging Devices (MIDs)
X-ray Radiography
X-ray Generator
CT
MRI Ultrasound Nuclear Medicine
SPECT
PET
Figure 1: Taxonomy of MIDs.
X-ray Generator. X-ray generators produce radiographic
images by projecting short X-ray pulses through the pa-
tient using electromagnetic energy sources and measur-
ing the X-ray waves passing from the patient (i.e., after
passing through the patient) using X-ray detectors. Dif-
ferent tissue such as bone, soft tissue, and air inside the
patient result in a heterogeneous distribution of X-rays
that creates the image [50]. The X-ray’s detector might
be a computed radiography cassette, where photo-stimu-
lated luminescence screens capture the X-rays and trans-
form them into digital form [51], or digital radiography
(DR), where images are directly transformed into digital
form; this makes DR scans faster, accurate, and radiation
dose effective (i.e., use the minimal radiation dose, above
which there is no significant improvement in quality). The
unique properties of X-ray technology, such as projecting
densities of different tissues on the image, makes X-ray use
very popular in many medical domains, such as diagnosis
of bone fractures, lung pathologies (including cancer), or
dental diagnosis. X-ray radiation is ionizing, with enough
energy to potentially cause damage to the deoxyribonucleic
acid (DNA) structure of different organic tissues. Poten-
tial risks from exposure to such ionizing radiation include
damage to tissues and skin or increased risk of cancer. The
actual radiation risks of different organs and tissues vary
according to their different sensitivity to radiation expo-
sure [52].
Computed tomography (CT). CT is an essential and pop-
ular X-ray generator modality (§ 2.4). CT images are
produced by passing X-ray waves through the body at
various angles; these X-ray waves are emitted from X-ray
tubes rotating around the patient’s body, producing many
slices (two-dimensional images of a three-dimensional or-
gan). Arrays of detectors located opposite the X-ray tubes
measure the exiting X-ray waves in analog form, and then
the data is reconstructed into digital images using a com-
puter. Similar to the X-ray generator (§ 2.4), CT modal-
ities produce ionizing radiation and thus may be danger-
ous [47]. This unique imaging technique enables the pro-
duction of high-resolution images, making CT a favorite,
significant, and critical resource for the diagnosis of many
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medical conditions, such as emergency diagnosis of a sub-
dural hematoma, ruptured disks, aneurysms, and other
pathologies. CT modalities are very expensive; the cost
depends on the number of detectors that the modality has
(e.g., 16 slices, 64 slices, 128 slices, and even 256 slices).
Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). MRI uses magnetic
fields to create RF effects, which are measured to pro-
duce images. During the scan, the patient is positioned
inside a scanner tube which, consists of a magnet (cur-
rently a superconducting magnet is usually used), which
produces strong magnetic fields (about 10,000 to 60,000
times stronger than the earth’s magnetic field) around the
patient. The magnetic field aligns protons (i.e., hydro-
gen atoms) inside water molecules contained in different
tissues of the patient. RF pulses are used to excite the
protons and move them from their precessional frequency.
When the protons return to their original position, they
emit RF radiation, which is then measured by the MRI
modality. Each tissue has a different proton resonance fre-
quency; therefore, by measuring the RF emitted, the MRI
modality can reconstruct an image that represents inter-
nal tissues. Since protons exist in water molecules, MRI
achieves the best results when diagnosing soft tissues, rich
with hydrogen atoms. Hence, it is popular for neurological
imaging, as well as musculoskeletal imaging. MRI modal-
ities are expensive, usually even more expensive than CT
modalities, due to the cost of the magnet; thus, in many
hospitals, only a few MRI modalities are installed. To
improve the accuracy, the process of aligning the protons
using the magnetic field and measuring the emitted RF ra-
diation is repeated several times, making MRI scans longer
in duration than CT scans (i.e., several minutes compared
to several seconds). Because of this, MRI scans may not
be appropriate for individual patients, such as pediatric
patients and patients that are unable to hold still for some
time. Moreover, the use of large magnetic fields prevents
patients with pacemakers or other metal implants from
getting MRI scans. Although MRI does not emit ionizing
radiation [53], the combination of static gradient magnetic
fields and RF radiation during MRI scans may generate
heat and harm a patient’s tissues or cause damage to the
patient’s DNA structure [49].
Ultrasound. Ultrasound uses a short duration of high-fre-
quency sound waves, which are generated and transmit-
ted into the patient’s body. The waves are then reflected
to the device by the internal structures of the body, cre-
ating echoes. These echoes are reconstructed into a lin-
ear array of tomographic slices of the tissues of interest,
showing the motion of the tissues (e.g., fetus movements).
Ultrasound imaging is preferred in obstetrical patients to
monitor the fetus during pregnancy, making ultrasound
modalities common in a hospital’s OB/GYN15, and ma-
ternal care departments. However, since sound waves do
15obstetrics and gynecology
not travel well in air and bones, ultrasound is more limited
compared to X-ray generators, CT, or MRI.
Nuclear Medicine. Nuclear medicine uses a chemical sub-
stance containing a radioactive isotope and measures the
radioactive decay of the isotope, which is emitted in the
form of gamma radiation, in order to produce the im-
age. The isotope is given to the patient before the exam
orally, by injection, or by inhalation, and the exam be-
gins once the agent (i.e., the isotope) has distributed it-
self according to the physiological status of the patient.
The most popular nuclear medicine techniques are gamma
cameras: single-photon emission computed tomography
(SPECT) and positron-emission tomography (PET) [50].
These technologies are often used in neurological and car-
diac imaging. Hybrid imaging allows combining SPECT
and PET technologies with CT and MRI into one modal-
ity, such as SPECT/CT, SPECT/MRI [54], PET/CT,
or PET/MRI [55]. Hybrid imaging usually produces en-
hanced results due to the combination of different tech-
nologies. For example, in the cardiac domain, SPECT/CT
imaging is used to image the heart at rest and during exer-
cise to evaluate the heart’s blood flow, which helps detect
narrowing of the arteries [56]. Similarly, PET/CT imag-
ing is used for diagnosing the effectiveness of chemother-
apy in cancer or diagnosing the effectiveness of glucose
metabolism.
3. The TLDR Methodology
In this section, we present the Threat identification, on-
tology-based Likelihood, severity Decomposition, and Risk
integration (TLDR)16 methodology for information secu-
rity risk assessment for medical devices. Note that the D
part of the TLDR methodology (§ 3.6 to § 3.8) is beyond
the scope of the current study and will be discussed in a
separate paper that we are preparing.
3.1. Identifying the Potentially Vulnerable Components
Using AFDs
The first step of the TLDR methodology for informa-
tion security risk assessment for medical devices is identi-
fying the potentially vulnerable components using Attack
Flow Diagrams (AFDs), which are diagrams of medical
devices, consisting of their main components, and Infor-
mation Flow Vectors (IFVs) between these components.
On each IFV, we will mark in the next step (§ 3.2) the IDs
of all attacks that potentially utilize the IFV as part of
the attack. This helps to visualize, for each device: (1) its
main components, (2) the information flow between these
components, (3) all its relevant attacks, and (4) the poten-
tial flow of these attacks. This approach is based on the
16TLDR is our way of referring to the common Internet-based
acronym Too Long; Didn’t Read (TL;DR), since we hope that our
methodology can facilitate the lengthy process of risk assessment.
7
TIdentifying the potentially
vulnerable components
using AFDs (§ 3.1)
Identifying the potential
attacks and marking
them on the AFDs (§ 3.2) DL
Decomposing each attack
into several severity
aspects and assigning
them weights (§ 3.6)
Assessing the magnitude
of the impact of each
of the severity aspects
for each attack (§ 3.7)
Computing the composite
severity assessments
for each attack (§ 3.8)
Mapping the discov-
ered attacks into their
relevant CAPECs (§ 3.3)
Estimating the likelihood
of the generic CAPECs
into which the potential
attacks are mapped (§ 3.4)
Computing the
CAPEC-based like-
lihood estimates for
each attack (§ 3.5)
Integrating the likelihood
and severity of each
attack into its risk and
prioritizing it (§ 3.9)
R
Figure 2: The TLDR methodology:
T Threat identification (3.1, 3.2).
L ontology-based Likelihood (3.3 to 3.5) performed by ISEs.
D severity Decomposition (3.6 to 3.8) performed by MEs
(beyond the scope of the current study).
R Risk integration (3.9).
data flow diagram, a widely used methodology for graphi-
cally representing the data flow inside complex information
systems [57]. The AFD symbols are self-explanatory; nev-
ertheless, a detailed legend of the symbols is provided in
Table 1.
In addition to creating AFDs for specific medical de-
vices (e.g., CT), it is possible to create AFDs for generic
medical devices. For example, we have created an AFD for
the generic MID that consists of components that typically
appear in most MIDs. Defining a generic medical device
is useful for many purposes, such as for (1) describing at-
tacks targeting the surrounding components of the medical
device; (2) consolidating basic attack scenarios which po-
tentially target any wide variety of medical devices; (3) de-
Table 1: Detailed Legend of AFD’s Symbols.
Shape Description
Component
A fundamental component that represents a pro-
cess (or several processes) that performs a well-de-
fined operation.
Sub-
component
A subcomponent is a component that is further
expanded into an additional AFD.
Terminator
A terminator is a component which represents a
beginning or termination of the flow.
Network
A network represents an abstract structure of sev-
eral connected components, such as the Internet
or internal hospital networks.
Logical
Encapsulation
A logical encapsulation represents an encapsula-
tion of several components, separating them from
outer components. Outer components can con-
sider the logical encapsulation as a “black box”
with well-defined inputs and outputs for interac-
tion.
Outer
Component
An outer component is a component which is not
directly a part of the analyzed device, usually out-
side a logical encapsulator.
Component A
Component B
Directed
Edge
A directed edge is a potential IFV between two
components.
Component A
Component B
Bold Edge
(1)
(2)
A bold edge is a directed edge that takes part in
an attack; thus, on this edge, we mark the discov-
ered attacks’ IDs (see § 3.2), using blue to repre-
sent IDs of existing attacks, and red to represent
IDs of new attacks that we have discovered.
Component A
Component B
Bold
Numbers
(1),(3)
(2),(4)
Bold numbers represent IDs of newly discovered
attacks (with regards to previously identified at-
tacks in the TLDR methodology), which are only
relevant to the current medical device, marked on
edge previously introduced in another AFD (e.g.,
the AFD of the generic MID).
scribing attacks on medical devices for which we did not
find unique attacks; (4) lay the groundwork for advanced
attack scenarios of specific medical devices; and (5) pro-
vide a solid foundation for future research to expand the
abstract AFD for additional unique modalities.
3.2. Identifying the Potential Attacks and Marking Them
on the AFDs
The second step of the TLDR methodology includes
identifying all the potential attacks and marking them on
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the AFDs (§ 3.2). For this step, using AFDs becomes very
useful for identifying vulnerabilities as well as visualizing
the attacks. First, we shall mark, in blue, all known at-
tacks, such as attacks that may already happen or that
have been mentioned in the literature. Next, we shall
mark, in red, newly identified potential attacks that have
been discovered as a result of using our AFDs. Given the
nature of cyber attacks’ rapid development and constant
change, this step will require additional updates from time
to time (e.g., once new potential attacks are discovered).
3.3. Mapping the Discovered Attacks into Their Relevant
CAPECs
This step includes the mapping of each attack, which
was discovered in the previous step, into all relevant
CAPECs that describe the attack or can potentially im-
plement it. Since CAPEC provides standard definitions
of many attack patterns, we plan that this mapping would
be from many potential attacks into a significantly smaller
number of CAPECs. Furthermore, since the domain of
MIDs is unique, CAPEC may be missing a few patterns
which are unique for cyber attacks on MIDs; in such cases,
we shall suggest adding the missing patterns to CAPEC.
3.4. Estimating the Likelihood of the Generic CAPECs
into Which the Potential Attacks Are Mapped
CAPEC provides a rough estimate of the overall like-
lihood (see § 2.3) to most of its attack patterns; how-
ever, these estimates are too general for the unique med-
ical domain, and thus, may not be accurate enough for
us. To fine-tune CAPEC’s likelihood estimates, we re-es-
timate these values with the assistance of a panel of four
healthcare ISEs who specialize in medical devices’ security.
Users of the TLDR methodology are welcome to fine-tune
our estimates with the assistance of their own experts, to
get even more accurate results, specific for their organi-
zations. Simply ask your experts to re-estimate the likeli-
hood of each of the CAPECs and plug it into the tables we
present in the results chapter (§ 4). New attack incidents
may provide new insights that would require to update the
likelihood estimates from time to time.
3.5. Computing the CAPEC-based Likelihood Estimates
for Each Attack
Finally, we compute the CAPEC-based (i.e., overall)
likelihood estimates for each attack as themean of the like-
lihood estimates, given in § 3.4, of the relevant CAPECs
into which the potential attacks had been mapped in § 3.3.
Note that just like in Fuzzy Logic, one could argue that
the worst-case scenario should be considered by taking the
maximum likelihood of the relevant CAPECs, rather than
the mean likelihood, assuming that the attacker is aware
of everything that we are, as Stine et al. [41] did in their
risk scoring system (see § 2.2); however, we assume that an
attacker choice of a potential CAPEC is not based solely
on the likelihood of the CAPEC, since an attacker might
have other reasons to choose a potential CAPECs (e.g.,
an attacker lacks knowledge or resources required to im-
plement the CAPEC). Thus, we assume that all potential
CAPECs mapped to an attack are equally likely, implying
a mean likelihood of the mapped CAPECs of the attack
as the computed likelihood estimates of the attack. Note
that a constant shift c may be added (see § 4.10).
3.6. Decomposing Each Attack into Several Severity As-
pects and Assigning Them Weights
The severity of attacks is usually decomposed into spe-
cific aspects that affect the organization (e.g., CIA is used
in traditional risk assessment methodologies, see § 2.2).
The decomposed severity aspects do not affect the orga-
nization equally; thus, we can assign predetermined rela-
tive importance weights for each decomposed severity as-
pect, based on the organization’s policy. The defined de-
composed severity aspects and their weights will then be
used as predefined default weights throughout the TLDR
methodology. New attack incidents may provide new in-
sights that would require to update the weights from time
to time. Note that both the relative importance weights
and the specific magnitudes of the impact of the severity
aspects, represent measures of [dis]utility, and are entirely
different from the likelihood, which represents a measure
of probability.
In the current study, we are focusing on obtaining the
TLDR methodology’s likelihood estimates for each attack.
The severity decomposition steps of the TLDR methodol-
ogy and their validation are beyond the scope of the cur-
rent study and are discussed in a separate paper that we
are preparing. One can view our use of the TLDR method-
ology in the current study as using a trivial decomposition
of the severity into a single-aspect severity — i.e., the over-
all severity — and assigning it a weight of one.
3.7. Assessing the Magnitude of the Impact of Each of the
Severity Aspects for Each Attack
One can interpret the severity as the expected magni-
tude of the impact, denoting the assessment of the level,
or degree, of damage assuming the attack was successful.
For example, one could envision the ordinal scale as being
“None, Very Low, Low, Moderate, High, Very High.”
We assess the expected magnitude of the impact of
each of the decomposed severity aspects [in this particular
study, we used only single-aspect severity — the overall
severity — since this part is beyond the scope of the cur-
rent study], for each attack individually on a scale of zero
to five, with the assistance of a panel of MEs. Users of the
TLDR methodology can fine-tune our assessments with
their own experts by re-assessing the severity with the as-
sistance of their own experts, to get even more accurate
results, specific for their organizations, and plug it into
the tables we present in the results chapter (§ 4). New
attack incidents may provide new insights that would also
require to update the expected magnitude of the impact
of severity aspects.
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3.8. Computing the Composite Severity Assessments for
Each Attack
We compute the composite severity assessments for each
attack as the weighted sum of the magnitude of the im-
pact of the decomposed severity aspects for each attack,
weighted by the organization-specific relative importance
weights of these aspects, as defined in Eq. (2):
Severityj =
m∑
i=1
wi · si,j + c (2)
Where m is the number of decomposed severity aspects,
wi is the normalized relative importance weight of the i
th
decomposed severity aspect, si,j is the assessment of the
expected magnitude (degree) of the impact of the ith de-
composed severity aspect for the jth specific attack, and c
is a constant shift that may be added (see § 4.10).
Note that the validation of this step is beyond the scope
of the current study, in which we simply used the experts’
the overall severity assessments for each attack. This sim-
plification can be viewed as using the TLDR methodology
with only single-aspect severity for each attack, with a
weight of one.
3.9. Integrating the Likelihood and Severity of Each Attack
into Its Risk and Prioritizing It
We integrate the risk for each attack based on
Eq. (1) (see § 2.2), using the CAPEC-based likelihood
estimates (§ 3.5) and the composite severity assess-
ments (§ 3.8). The attacks’ risks can now be used to pri-
oritize the attacks from the defenders’ perspective.
3.10. Validating the TLDR Methodology’s Results
To validate our results, we followed the same steps as
the TLDR methodology; however, we asked the ISEs to
estimate also the direct overall likelihood for each attack
individually, instead of using the TLDR methodology. We
then defined two “consensus” vectors of the 23 potential at-
tacks: (1) the Mean of the Experts’ CAPEC-Based Like-
lihood Estimates (MECBLE) (computed indirectly), and
(2) the Mean of the Experts’ Direct-Likelihood Estimates
(MEDLE). To demonstrate the value and the validity of
using the TLDR methodology with respect to the relative
ranking of the 23 potential threats, we calculated the pair-
wise Spearman’s correlation between the CAPEC-based
(MECBLE) likelihood estimates and the direct estimates
of each of our ISEs and showed that the correlation is
high, while the pairwise correlation between the mean of
the direct estimates (the MEDLE) and each of the ISEs’
overall direct estimates was lower. To demonstrate that
we maintained the validity of the risk assessment pro-
cess, we calculated the paired T -test statistic between
the CAPEC-based (MECBLE) estimates and the direct
ISEs’ estimates, and showed that the null hypothesis is
accepted (i.e., there was no significant difference between
them). This implies that the CAPEC-based (MECBLE)
likelihood estimates, using the TLDR methodology, are as
valid as current direct risk assessment methodologies’ like-
lihood estimates; however, the CAPEC-based likelihood
estimates, computed from the mapped CAPECs, are much
easier to calculate. Note that we asked the ISEs to directly
estimate the likelihood of each attack individually before
we ask them to estimate it using the TLDR methodology
to eliminate a potential biased point of reference.
We shall also validate that the mapping of the discov-
ered attacks into their relevant CAPECs, indeed results
in a mapping of many attacks into a significantly smaller
number of CAPECs. This, together with good correlations,
will demonstrate, at least statistically, that instead of ask-
ing a panel of healthcare ISEs to estimate the likelihood
for each attack directly, we can only ask them to estimate
just a relatively small number of general CAPEC likeli-
hoods to achieve similar outcomes. Also, we shall validate
that using the AFDs, which helps discover new attacks by
measuring the number of newly discovered attacks.
4. Results
In this section, we present the results of the applica-
tion of the TLDR methodology (see § 3) to MIDs. We first
present the Threat identification (T) part of the TLDR
methodology: creating the AFDs of MIDs, which helps
us identify the potentially vulnerable components (§ 4.1)
and identify 23 potential attacks on MIDs (§ 4.2). Fol-
lowing that, we present the ontology-based Likelihood (L)
part of the TLDR methodology: mapping of the discov-
ered attacks into their relevant CAPECs (§ 4.3), estimat-
ing the likelihood of each CAPEC with the assistance of
the panel of healthcare ISEs’ (§ 4.4), and computing the
CAPEC-based likelihood estimates for each attack (§ 4.5).
As mentioned before, the severityDecomposition (D) part
of the TLDR methodology (§ 3.6 to § 3.8) is beyond the
scope of the current study and will be discussed in a sepa-
rate paper that we are preparing; thus, we replaced these
steps with a single simple step of assessing the overall
severity for each attack with the assistance of the panel
of Radiology Medical Experts (RMEs) (§ 4.7) and used it
as its severity. Following that, we present the Risk inte-
gration (R) part of the TLDR methodology: integrating
the risk for each attack and prioritizing it (§ 4.9). The
results are summarized in Table 2. Finally, we validate
the TLDR methodology’s results (§ 4.10) using statistical
metrics, such as the paired T -test and pairwise Spearman’s
correlation.
4.1. Identifying the Potentially Vulnerable Components
Using AFDs
Following the TLDR methodology, we begin with identi-
fying the potentially vulnerable components of MIDs using
AFDs. In this section, we create the AFDs of the generic
MIDs (see Figure 3), generic CT (see Figure 4), generic
MRI (see Figure 5), and generic ultrasound (see Figure 6).
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Table 2: The application of the TLDR methodology to MIDs.
Blue represents known attacks.
Red represents new attacks that we have discovered.
* Shift explained in § 4.10.
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1. Ransomware [2–12, 14, 15, 58] • 4.75 0.9 0.77 3.658
2. Disruption of patient-to-image linkage [18, 58] • • • 4.75 0.75 0.62 2.945
3. Alteration of the imaging exam’s results [58–60] • • • 4.5 0.75 0.62 2.79
4. Contrast material over/underdose • • 4.5 0.725 0.595 2.678
5. Leakage of patients’ private information • 3.25 0.75 0.62 2.015
6. Manipulation of data displayed on the host’s monitor [18] • • • • • 4.25 0.6 0.47 1.998
7. Mute safety alarms [18] • • • • • 3.5 0.6 0.47 1.645
8. Disruption of the imaging exam’s results [58] • • • • 3.5 0.6 0.47 1.645
9. Activate false safety alarms [18] • • • • • 3.25 0.6 0.47 1.528
10. Mechanical disruption of MID’s motors [58] • • • 3 0.633 0.503 1.509
11. Restore system [18] • 2.5 0.55 0.42 1.05
Defining attacks on the generic CT
12. Increase milliamperage-seconds [mAs] [18, 58] • • • 4.5 0.683 0.553 2.489
13. Increase kilovoltage peak [kVp] [18, 58] • • • 4.5 0.683 0.553 2.489
14. Radiation overdose [18, 58] • • • 4.5 0.683 0.553 2.489
15. Alteration of the IRS’s output images [58–60] • • • 3.5 0.75 0.62 2.17
16. Configuration file disruption [18, 58] • • • 3.75 0.683 0.553 2.074
17. Manipulation of CT calibration • • • • 3.5 0.65 0.52 1.82
18. Disruption of the IRS’s output images [58] • • • • 2.25 0.7375 0.608 1.367
Defining attacks on the generic MRI
19. Overwhelm of the MRI’s receiving coils with an over-
powered magnetic field [18]
• • • 4.25 0.6833 0.553 2.352
20. Magnetic field disruption [18] • • • • 3.5 0.6 0.47 1.645
21. External RF signal disruption • • 4 0.525 0.395 1.58
22. Activate quenching of MRI [18] • 3.75 0.45 0.32 1.2
Defining attacks on the generic ultrasound
23. Disruption of MEMS components [61] • • 3 0.675 0.545 1.635
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Note that we already marked the potential attacks, which
we identify in the following subsection. For each AFD of
MID, we describe the presented components and the data
flow inside the MID.
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Figure 3: The AFD of the generic MID, with the relevant IFVs and
attack vectors, that consists of components that typically appear in
most MIDs.
The AFD of the Generic MID. The AFD of the generic
MID includes components, which typically appear in most
MIDs:
A. The patient.
B. Complementary devices (i.e., devices that aid the MID
during the scan):
B1. Mechanical patient position system (mechanical
bed): a bed on which the patient lies. It is con-
trolled via the host control PC or the MID.
B2. Contrast injection system (CIS): a semi-auto-
matic or manual mechanical system for injecting
different contrast materials during the scan to en-
hance image results.17 It is controlled via the host
control PC or a special control unit.
B3. Patient monitoring systems: monitor the pa-
tient’s physical conditions (e.g., ECG18 for mon-
itoring heart rate).
17The CIS is connected to the patient’s blood system prior to the
scan.
18electrocardiography
B4. Monitor: the technician’s primary monitor in
the control room, presenting essential informa-
tion (e.g., scan’s results, MID, and patient moni-
toring).
B5. Electronic medical record (EMR) PC: presents
the patient’s electronic medical record (EMR),
including the scan configurations specified by the
physician. This functions as the technician’s in-
terface to the radiological information system19
and the PACS.
C. The medical imaging device (MID): performs the ac-
tual scan based on commands sent from the host con-
trol PC. It is often connected to the manufacturers
via a virtual private network (VPN) over the Internet
for technical monitoring. In the following sections, it
is expanded into several AFDs of unique MIDs with
specific attacks.
D. Host control PC: the central control unit of the MID,
operated by a certified technician, sending commands
to the MID and other components. The commands
are based on predefined scan protocol configurations,
which are modified by the technician to fit the desired
scan. It is connected to the hospital network for re-
mote access and for sending scan results to the PACS
database.
E. The technician operates the MID.
F. Networks: hospitals usually consist of two networks:
F1. Hospital networks: internal networks, usually fur-
ther divided into segments. Such networks are
notorious for security and privacy issues.
F2. Internet: the world wide web, including VPN
connections for monitoring the MIDs.
G. Picture archiving and communication system (PACS)
database: archives all patients’ images. The commu-
nication with it is done using the Digital Imaging and
Communications in Medicine (DICOM) protocol.
H. Medical doctor: specifies the required scan for the pa-
tient, evaluates the results, and can access the imaging
results from any workstation in the hospital.
The flow begins with the medical doctor (H) requesting
the scan from his office via a workstation in the hospital’s
network (F), which is then uploaded to the EMR system.
Once the patient (A) arrives to have the scan, the techni-
cian (E) extracts the scan request manually (i.e., by phys-
ically viewing it) from the EMR PC (B5) and configures
the host control PC (D) accordingly. Then, he connects
the patient (A) to complementary devices (B) by placing
the patient (A) on the mechanical bed (B1) and connect-
ing him to the CIS (B2), and the patient monitoring sys-
tems (B3). When the technician (E) initiates the scan, the
host control PC (D) sends control signals to the MID (C),
the mechanical bed (B1), and the CIS (B2), and receives
feedback from the MID (C) and the patient monitoring
systems (B3). The received feedback is presented on the
19The system that manages the workflow within the radiology de-
partment.
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primary monitor (B4).
At the top of the AFD, we present the interactions with
the patient (A). In case of problems or potential danger,
the technician (E) can apply various safety mechanisms
and stop the scanning process. The scan results are col-
lected via the host control PC (D) and sent to the PACS
database (G), which is accessible to the medical doctor (H)
via the hospital’s network (F1). Often, the raw data (i.e.,
before reconstruction20) is stored internally by the MID
(C) and is also accessible to the medical doctor (H).
It is important to note that today, MIDs are connected
directly to the Internet (F2) [62] in various ways, such as
directly to the manufacturer for monitoring, troubleshoot-
ing, and more [63], or via the PACS server (G) inside
the hospital’s internal network (F1), which is usually con-
nected to the Internet (F2). Although these interactions
are not part of the MID ecosystem, such connections make
MIDs very vulnerable since they enable potential access for
attackers from anywhere in the world.
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Figure 4: The AFD of the generic CT with the relevant IFVs and
attack vectors, based on [64, 65], which represents digital X-ray gen-
erators as well, due to their resemblance of CTs.
The AFD of the Generic CT. The AFD of the generic CT
includes the following components:
a. X-ray source emits ionizing radiation.
b. Gantry: the mechanical device that controls the X-ray
source, including the X-ray detectors, which measure
the output radiation. In CT, the patient lays inside
the tube containing the X-ray sources and detectors.
In some cases, manufacturers open a VPN connection
from the Internet for monitoring purposes.
20Processing raw analog signal measurements into digital images.
c. Image Reconstruction System (IRS): the computer
that collects the raw data of the image, produced by
the gantry’s radiation measures during the scan, and
reconstructs it into DICOM images, which are sent to
the host control PC.
Once the scan is initiated, the host control PC (D) sends
commands to the gantry (b), which controls the X-ray
source (a) and measures the X-ray effects from the patient
(A). The gantry (b) sends the raw results to the IRS (c),
via the host control PC (D) or directly in some devices,
for reconstruction.21 The reconstructed image is then sent
to the host control PC (D), and the flow continues as it
did in Figure 3, including the interactions with the Inter-
net (F2). The gantry’s (b) inner components breakdown
is out of the scope of the current study.
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Figure 5: The AFD of the generic MRI with the relevant IFVs and
attack vectors, based on [53, 66–69].
The AFD of the Generic MRI. The AFD of the generic
MRI includes the following components:
a. Front-end controller: sometimes referred to as the
pulse programmer, translates and forwards commands
21In some devices the gantry (b) sends results directly to the IRS
(c).
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to control signals for different components (e.g., mag-
nets, gradient systems, RF system, etc.).
b. RF modulator & amplifier: generates RF pulses from
the synthesizer and monitors specific absorption rate
limits,22 preventing an overpowered scan from taking
place. This expensive component can amplify signals
from 10 kW to an order of 16 kW.
c. Gradient system: linearly varies the direction of the
magnetic field to implement pulse sequences.
d. Synthesizer: generates an RF (i.e., the center fre-
quency), which is used in the demodulation of the re-
ceived signal to centralize it around zero. Without the
synthesizer, the center frequency may differ from one
patient to another, which may cause inaccurate results.
e. MRI coils:
e1. Gradient coil: generates three orthogonal linear
magnetic field gradients, varying the magnetic
field for spatially encoding of the magnetic res-
onance (MR) signal’s location. It is mounted on
a cylindrical former inside the bore of the magnet.
The higher the maximum gradient amplitude, the
smaller the field of view, and the thinner the slice
widths. Several specialized scanning techniques
(e.g., diffusion imaging) require high peak gradi-
ent amplitudes.
e2. Superconducting magnet: the main component
of the MRI, with magnetic field strength (i.e.,
flux density) of 1.5T to 3T for clinical use, and
over 3T for research purposes. The higher the
magnetic field strength, the better the SNR23
(i.e., the better the image quality) is; therefore,
the SNR is the most useful image quality pa-
rameter. The homogeneity of the magnetic field
is another crucial factor, which is measured in
parts per million within a given spherical vol-
ume, defined as the diameter spherical volume.
There are four main types of magnets used in
MRIs: air-cored, iron-cored (i.e., electromagnet),
permanent, and superconducting, which is the
most popular today. Superconducting magnets
are held at temperatures that approach absolute
zero (−273.13 ◦C or 0K) to allow zero electrical
resistance. To achieve that, these magnets are
held in a cryogenic bath (i.e., liquid helium) at
less than 4.2K. When a problem occurs, and the
magnet needs to be turned off immediately, the
magnet can be put in quench state, and the liquid
helium, keeping the magnet cold, is released, caus-
ing the magnet to stop functioning altogether.
e3. RF coil: used to transmit and receive RF signals,
where the transmission must be a homogeneous
RF magnetic field.
e4. Surface coil: a physical coil that is placed directly
22The potential for heating the patient’s tissue due to the applica-
tion of the RF energy.
23signal to noise ratio
over the anatomical region of interest for better
signal reception.
e5. Safety sensors: alerts about dangerous situations.
They include thermal and oxygen level sensors,
which alert about abnormal temperature and dan-
gerous depletion of oxygen, which may happen
when there is a helium gas leak from the quench
pipe.
f. RF screen: acts as a Faraday cage to reduce the ex-
tended fringe field from the magnet and the interfer-
ence from external transmitters.
g. Quadrature demodulator & IRS: boosts signals de-
tected from the surface coils, mixes them with the RF
from the synthesizer, converts the analog raw data into
digital data, and reconstructs the image.
The flow begins when the MRI enters the initialization
stage, which includes tuning the components. When a
scan configuration is entered, the host control PC (D) ver-
ifies that the values are within the hardware limits (e.g.,
maximum gradient strength) or software limits (e.g., the
maximum number of slices). Afterward, the commands
are sent to the front-end controller (a), which translates
and forwards the commands to the gradient system (c),
the synthesizer (d), the magnet (e2), and the RF coil (e3).
The RF modulator (b) verifies that the RF signal is within
a safe range, and the gradient system (c) creates the gra-
dient field.
The internal flow inside the MRI’s gantry (which is pre-
sented as a logical encapsulation) begins when the gradient
coil (e1) generates the magnetic field gradients for spatially
encoding the location of the MR signal. The magnet (e2)
produces the magnetic field, and the RF coil (e3) measures
the RF radiation emitted from the patient (A) and sends
raw results to the IRS (g) for reconstruction. Note that
the synthesizer (d) is also connected to the IRS (g) for the
initial tuning of the signals. The surface coil (e4) is used
to increase signal reception. The RF screen (f) protects
the coils from the outside RF signals, which may interfere
with the results. The reconstructed images are sent back
to the host control PC (D), and the flows continue as it
did in Figure 3.
The AFD of the Generic Ultrasound. The AFD of the
generic ultrasound includes the following components:
a. Transducer: a physical component that transmits ul-
trasonic signals and measures the time between the
transmission and reception. This component can be
divided into transmit and receive transducers.
b. Transmit/receive switches: control when the trans-
ducer will transmit and when it will receive since the
transducer performs both functions.
c. Analog signal processing: reconstructs the image using
the analog ultrasonic signals detected (similar to the
IRS).
d. Pulsers: creates the electric pulses for the ultrasonic
transmission.
The technician configures the scan using the host control
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Figure 6: The AFD of a generic ultrasound with the relevant IFVs
and attack vectors, based on [70–72].
PC (D), which sends commands to the pulsers (d) that
create the ultrasonic pulses. The switches (b) manage the
incoming and outgoing pulses so that they do not interfere
with one another. Once the pulses reach the transducer
(a), the operator presses the transducer (a) against the
skin of the patient (A) and measures the returning pulses.
The measurements are received in an analog form and sent
to the analog signal processing (c) for reconstruction. The
final results are sent to the host control PC (D), and the
flows continue as in Figure 3.
4.2. Identifying the Potential Attacks and Marking Them
on the AFDs
In this section, we provide a detailed description of each
of the 23 potential attacks that we have found. We list the
attacks based on the relevant MID that it affects.
Generic MID Attacks.
Attack 1 (Ransomware [2–12, 14, 15, 58]).
Since MIDs rely on computers to operate, ransomware at-
tacks (CAPEC 542) such as the WannaCry cyber attack
(see § Appendix A) mentioned earlier, can lock the host
control PC and make the MID nonoperational, damaging
the availability on a large scale. Also, it can encrypt the
scan results or essential system files in critical situations
and may put patients at risk. New ransomware attacks
may also involve malicious firmware updates of various
components of the MID. In those cases, cleaning the host
PC will not restore the system.
Attack 2 (Disruption of patient-to-image linkage [18, 58]).
The scan results are linked to the specific EMR of the
patient being scanned. Linking different results and pa-
tient information to specific patients is done inside the
host control PC, and the linked results are sent to the
PACS server using the DICOM protocol. Targeted mal-
ware (CAPEC 542) resident on the host control PC can
disrupt these linkages (CAPEC 165), by either linking the
result to the wrong patient or relating the wrong results to
the patient being scanned. This attack is sophisticated and
requires specific insider knowledge (CAPEC 150). This
attack can affect many patients (i.e., scale), causing incor-
rect diagnosis of patients, improper treatment, and privacy
issues. This attack is technically similar to Attack 3 (Al-
teration of the imaging exam’s results [58–60]).
Attack 3 (Alteration of the imaging exam’s results [58–
60]).
The attacker attempts to alter the output image of the
imaging exam in order either to hide a medical condition
(e.g., remove a dangerous tumor) or to deceive (e.g., in-
ject a nonexistent tumor), leading to improper treatment
of patients. Since patients often receive treatment based
on the imaging results, the outcome of such an attack can
be very dangerous, including direct physical harm to pa-
tients, which could be fatal in some cases. Furthermore,
if performed well, it is very challenging to detect the at-
tack and notice that something is wrong; thus, an attacker
could create a small change in the image for all patients,
which may have no significant influence on the patient in
the short run but could damage the health of many pa-
tients (i.e., scale) in the long run.
Attack 4 (Contrast material over/underdose).
The CIS is often used in MID exams in order to inject dif-
ferent contrast materials and enhance the scan’s results.
The CIS is a mechanical system that is connected to the
patient’s blood system and remotely operated via a special
control unit or the host control PC. The CIS is semi-auto-
matically activated by the technician and the host control
PC during the exam. Targeted malware (CAPEC 542) res-
ident on the host control PC can manipulate the amount
of contrast material injected. The severity of this attack
may result in disrupted exam results due to incorrect con-
trast material dose and potential adverse side effects to the
patient due to over-injection of the contrast material (e.g.,
overdose with potential toxicity). In addition, misuse of
this system may damage it.
Attack 5 (Leakage of patients’ private information).
MIDs have access to sensitive private information that en-
ables patient identification, as well as the patient’s EMR,
in order to link the exam results to the patient’s EMR. In
addition, MIDs are connected to the hospital’s network,
and in many cases, are connected directly to the manufac-
turer’s monitoring systems via the Internet. This makes
MIDs a potential gateway for leakage of patients’ sensitive
private information such as exam results or other private
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information that the MID has access to. Also, this attack
may leak private information of many patients (i.e., scale).
Attack 6 (Manipulation of data displayed on the host’s
monitor [18]).
The host’s monitor is the primary monitor that the tech-
nician uses during the scan. This attack is similar to At-
tack 9 (Activate false safety alarms [18]), however, in addi-
tion, it displays all of the information related to the scan,
the patient, and the MID, such as the scan’s configura-
tions and results, the patient’s physical condition, and the
control and configuration panel of the MID. The severity
of this attack is only related to the patient. A targeted
malware may present false information to the monitor,
which may be completely different from the real informa-
tion (e.g., a normal heart rate while the actual heart rate
is high, or vice versa), in order to influence the scan, af-
fecting the physical condition of the patient as well as the
diagnosis. Such malware can easily evade detection; hence,
it may affect many patients before being discovered.
Attack 7 (Mute safety alarms [18]).
Technically similar to Attack 9 (Activate false safety
alarms [18]); however, in this attack, instead of activat-
ing false alarms, the attacker tries to mute safety alarms.
This may prevent the MID from being automatically or
manually stopped if a dangerous situation occurs, which
could be fatal.
Attack 8 (Disruption of the imaging exam’s results [58]).
Technically similar to Attack 3 (Alteration of the imag-
ing exam’s results [58–60]); however, this attack focuses
merely on disrupting the exam’s results, possibly requir-
ing repeating the exam. The attacker can do so by
manipulating files (CAPEC 165) and common resources
(CAPEC 150) or by jamming (CAPEC 601) and disabling
the route of the output image (CAPEC 582), which inter-
feres with patient diagnosis. While this attack may not
always be severe, in cases that require immediate care to
the patient, even the briefest delay may be fatal.
Attack 9 (Activate false safety alarms [18]).
Most MIDs include various safety alarms and monitors,
such as fire alarms, oxygen alarms, heart rate monitors,
blood pressure monitors, etc. These alarms include sen-
sors that are configured to automatically stop the MID’s
operation in case of a problem or issue and alert the tech-
nician to turn off the MID manually. Some alarm systems
include standalone alarms (e.g., a red light or speaker),
which are more challenging to activate. However, some
alarms are connected to a centralized computer, such as
the host control PC, or other computers in the MID’s
ecosystem. A targeted malware (CAPEC 542) on such
a computer can activate false alarms to cause the MID to
automatically or manually (by the technician) stop dur-
ing treatment (e.g., interventional radiology), which may
put the patient at increased risk. In some cases, such op-
eration could also damage the device itself, affecting its
availability. This attack pattern uses environment hard-
ware and sensors (our new attack pattern: CAPEC NEW
Manipulate Environment Hardware or Sensors), as well as
additional obstruction (CAPEC-607: Obstruction)24 at-
tack patterns: disabling the route to/from the alarm or
the sensor (CAPEC 582), jamming alarms that use RF
communication (CAPEC 601), and blockage of alarm or
sensor (CAPEC 603). The severity of such an attack range
from damage to the MID to physical harm to the patient.
Attack 10 (Mechanical disruption of MID’s motors [58]).
MID ecosystems include several components with mechan-
ical motors: mechanical bed motors, scanner motors, ro-
tation motors, etc. The motors receive instructions from
a control unit (e.g., the host control PC). Targeted mal-
ware (CAPEC 542) can change the commands controlling
these motors (i.e., CAPEC NEW: manipulate environment
hardware or sensors), causing an undesired change in the
movement of these motors. By misusing the motors, this
attack can directly damage the device, possibly wrecking
the motors and damaging their availability and the avail-
ability of the MID. Also, since these motors physically in-
teract with the patient, this attack may potentially harm
the patient by making the motors move in a way that hurts
the patient.
Attack 11 (Restore system [18]).
This attack attempts to use the system restore option
(CAPEC 166) found in most computers in MID ecosys-
tems (e.g., the host control PC) or externally restore the
system to factory default configurations. This attack may
cause a loss of data (e.g., scan results) or a loss of custom
configurations set by the technician. This may affect the
availability of the device, resulting in delayed treatment
for patients.
Generic CT Attacks.
Attack 12 (Increase milliamperage-seconds [mAs] [18,
58]).
Similar to Attack 13 (Increase kilovoltage peak [kVp] [18,
58]); however, this attack targets another specific param-
eter of the radiation. This parameter measures the radia-
tion produced [mA] over a set of time [s] [73]; increasing
the mA results in an increase in the quantity of radiation.
Malicious manipulation of this parameter by targeted mal-
ware is very dangerous and may cause distorted or incor-
rect image results and radiation overdose to the patient,
which may put the patient at risk.
Attack 13 (Increase kilovoltage peak [kVp] [18, 58]).
Similar to Attack 14 (Radiation overdose [18, 58]); how-
ever, this attack targets a specific parameter of the radia-
tion. The kVp parameter determines the highest energy
of X-ray photon, and the radiation dose to the patient
24https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/607.html
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is directly proportional to the square of kVp. Increas-
ing the kVp will decrease the contrast seen between soft
tissue and bone [74]. Malicious manipulation of this pa-
rameter by targeted malware is very dangerous and may
cause distorted or incorrect image results as well as radi-
ation overdose to the patient, which may put the patient
at risk.
Attack 14 (Radiation overdose [18, 58]).
Similar to Attack 16 (Configuration file disruption [18,
58]); however, this attack targets the radiation configu-
rations directly. The implications of this attack are very
dangerous, as it may cause radiation overdose to the pa-
tient, which may put the patient at risk. Furthermore,
the attacker may increase the radiation dosage to amounts
that are not immediately noticeable but could potentially
increase the risk of the development of cancer in the future;
this attack may affect many patients (i.e., scale) before it
is discovered.
Attack 15 (Alteration of the IRS’s output images [58–
60]).
Similar to Attack 3 (Alteration of the imaging exam’s re-
sults [58–60]); however, this attack targets a different com-
ponent (CAPEC 150): the IRS inside the CT, affecting
the diagnosis of patients. In addition, this attack may
affect many patients whose images were not yet sent to
the PACS. It is also vulnerable to the same attacks as
Attack 18.
Attack 16 (Configuration file disruption [18, 58]).
The entire CT scan operation is defined in the scan con-
figuration file, inside the host control PC, making it ex-
tremely important. By manipulating the file, an attacker
can change the CT’s behavior. Moreover, the attacker can
change the output commands directly for a similar effect.
Targeted malware (CAPEC 542) resident on the host con-
trol PC can manipulate this file (CAPEC 165, CAPEC 75)
to control the entire CT operation. Since the CT opera-
tion physically affects the patient, this attack also affects
the patient in this way, as well as affecting the patient’s
diagnosis. In addition, misuse of the configurations may
damage the MID. Since the attacker can manipulate con-
figurations, which may not be noticeable immediately, this
attack may affect many patients (i.e., scale) before it is dis-
covered.
Attack 17 (Manipulation of CT calibration).
The CT is pre-calibrated so that it will work cor-
rectly. This attack attempts to manipulate this calibra-
tion and cause the device to use parameters with an offset
(CAPEC 166). Incorrect calibration may damage the de-
vice, possibly destroying it and damaging the availability
of the MID. Many people may use the CT with the wrong
calibration before the problem is discovered. In addition,
incorrect calibration of the device may result in misdiag-
nosis of the patient or radiation overdose (e.g., calibrating
the radiation parameters to include a large offset in each
scan).
Attack 18 (Disruption of the IRS’s output images [58]).
Similar to Attack 8 (Disruption of the imaging exam’s re-
sults [58]); however, this attack targets a different compo-
nent (CAPEC 150): the IRS inside the CT modality. This
component is usually a standard Windows PC, and it is
difficult to update it regularly since it runs the specific soft-
ware of the manufacturer. This makes it very vulnerable
to attacks, with a severity similar to Attack 8 (Disruption
of the imaging exam’s results [58]).
Generic MRI Attacks.
Attack 19 (Overwhelm of the MRI’s receiving coils with
an overpowered magnetic field [18]).
Similar to Attack 16 (Configuration file disruption [18,
58]); however, targeting the MRI receiving coils. A tar-
geted malware (CAPEC 542) can create a powerful mag-
netic field by manipulating the scan configuration files
(CAPEC 75 and CAPEC 165), which can damage the
receiving coils and possibly cause damage to other elec-
tronics nearby that are sensitive to magnetic fields.
Attack 20 (Magnetic field disruption [18]).
Technically similar to Attack 19 (Overwhelm of the MRI’s
receiving coils with an overpowered magnetic field [18]);
however, this attack focus on disrupting output images.
In addition to the attack patterns described in Attack 19,
this attack may also use jamming of the RF signal
(CAPEC 601). This attack may result in high RF ra-
diation capable of causing heat burns to the patient and
possible damage to the machine.
Attack 21 (External RF signal disruption).
An attacker can position a strong RF antenna inside or
close to the MRI’s Faraday cage (e.g., position the antenna
inside a truck and park the truck very close to the MRI
room), which can interfere with the MRI’s RF measures
(CAPEC 601 and CAPEC 582). This can corrupt the
exam’s results and cause increased RF radiation, which
may put the patient at risk. If such an antenna is covertly
placed, this attack may affect many patients before it is
discovered.
Attack 22 (Activate quenching of MRI [18]).
Similar to Attack 9 (Activate false safety alarms [18]); how-
ever, specific to the MRI. MRI usually uses superconduct-
ing magnets, which use liquid hydrogen to maintain a low
temperature. Quenching refers to a situation in which the
temperature of the magnet suddenly rises (e.g., due to a
fire or sudden release of the liquid hydrogen), which may
be triggered by our new attack pattern CAPEC NEW: Ma-
nipulate Environment Hardware or Sensors. In such cases,
there is a danger of asphyxia, hypothermia, and ruptured
eardrums to the patient. In addition, quenching may take
weeks to fix, affecting the availability of the MRI to many
patients whose treatment may be delayed. This may also
damage the device itself.
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Generic Ultrasound Attacks.
Attack 23 (Disruption of MEMS components [61]).
Microelectromechanical systems (MEMS) are components
consisting of microscopic devices with mechanical moving
parts, widely used in a variety of devices and applica-
tions, including medical devices such as pacemakers and
insulin pumps [75]. Since MEMS consists of mechanical
moving parts, they are sensitive to interference caused by
sound vibrations. At the Black Hat USA conference held
in 2017 in Las Vegas, Pan et al. [61] demonstrated that ul-
trasound effects on devices with MEMS components could
disrupt virtual reality devices and self-balancing vehicles
(e.g., Segway). A targeted malware (CAPEC 542) can af-
fect the ultrasound hardware directly (our new attack pat-
tern CAPEC NEW: Manipulate Environment Hardware or
Sensors) so that it acts similarly to that presented by Pan
et al. [61] and disrupts MEMS components near or inside
the patient, such as ICDs and insulin pumps, making these
devices malfunction; this may be fatal; however, no such
experiment has been performed to assess this threat.
4.3. Mapping the Discovered Attacks into Their Relevant
CAPECs
In Table 2, we present the results of our mapping of the
discovered attacks into their relevant CAPECs (see §3.3).
As we can see, we were able to map the 23 potential attacks
into one or more of the following eight general CAPEC
standard attack patterns and to an additional new attack
pattern that we suggest adding:
CAPEC 75 (Manipulating Writeable Configuration
Files). An adversary manipulates configuration files that
define how the system operates (e.g., the operation of the
device during an imaging scan). This attack differs from
CAPEC 165 as it does not attempt to cause improper be-
havior, but instead, it attempts to cause proper behavior
for improper configurations.
CAPEC 150 (Collect Data from Common Resource Lo-
cations). An attacker easily accesses sensitive data stored
in predefined or common resource locations (e.g., imaging
results are saved in a default directory).
CAPEC 165 (File Manipulation). An adversary at-
tempts to cause the improper behavior of the system by
modifying the content or attributes of files that the sys-
tem processes (e.g., manipulate the image result of the
imaging scan). This attack is commonly combined with
CAPEC 150, which focuses on accessing the location of
the files.
CAPEC 166 (Force the System to Reset Values). An at-
tacker reconfigures the system to an initial state, possibly
by using the system’s existing reset functions (e.g., Win-
dows restore), potentially allowing the attacker to bypass
security (e.g., use default passwords) and disable services.
CAPEC 542 (Targeted Malware). An attacker devel-
ops a targeted malware, usually exploiting a vulnerability
in the targeted system or the IT infrastructure (e.g., the
WannaCry attack).
CAPEC 582 (Route Disabling). An attacker disrupts
the network communication route (i.e., channel) between
targets.
CAPEC 601 (Jamming). An attacker disrupts the com-
munication using RF signals or illicit traffic, causing pos-
sible DoS25.
CAPEC 603 (Blockage). An attacker denies the system
access or delivery of critical resources, causing a possible
DoS attack.
In addition to the eight standard CAPEC attack pat-
terns, we define and use a new attack pattern in the TLDR
methodology, following the CAPEC format:
CAPEC NEW (Manipulate Environment Hardware or
Sensors). Child of CAPEC 17626. An adversary interferes
with various sensors of the system in an attempt to affect
the system’s behavior. E.g., an adversary may increase
the temperature in the environment of the system in order
to cause the temperature sensor to activate, affecting the
system.
We suggest including CAPEC NEW in the official
CAPEC ontology since we were unable to identify an ex-
isting attack pattern in the taxonomy that corresponds to
this pattern.
4.4. Estimating the Likelihood of the Generic CAPECs
into Which the Potential Attacks Are Mapped
In Table 3, we present the results, in descending order,
of our panel of four healthcare ISEs, each individually,
CAPECs likelihood estimates (see § 3.4), which we use
throughout the rest of the TLDRmethodology. All experts
had a similar level of expertise, each individually with over
ten years of experience in the relevant field, CISOs of ma-
jor HMOs; therefore, to obtain each value, we computed a
simple mean of their answers. Note that the experts were
not asked to map each attack into the relevant CAPECs;
this was done by the authors.
4.5. Computing the CAPEC-Based Likelihood Estimates
for Each Attack
In Table 2, we present the computed CAPEC-based like-
lihood estimates for each attack, using the CAPEC like-
lihood estimates from Table 3. The resulting likelihood
estimates are higher by an average of 0.13 compared with
the direct estimates (see § 4.10); thus, we have shifted the
likelihood estimates by a constant of c = −0.13.
25Denial of Service
26https://capec.mitre.org/data/definitions/176.html
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Table 3: Estimating the likelihood of the generic CAPECs into which
the potential attacks are mapped, provided by our panel of healthcare
ISEs.
CAPEC ID Estimation
CAPEC 542 4.5
CAPEC 150 3.75
CAPEC 582 3.5
CAPEC 165 3
CAPEC 603 3
CAPEC 75 2.75
CAPEC 166 2.75
CAPEC NEW 2.25
CAPEC 601 1.75
4.6. Decomposing Each Attack into Several Severity As-
pects and Assigning Them Weights
This step is beyond the scope of the current study
(see § 3.6) and will be discussed in a separate paper that
we are preparing.
4.7. Assessing the Magnitude of the Impact of Each of the
Severity Aspects for Each Attack
In Table 2, we present the results of the single-aspect
severity assessments for each attack by our panel of four
RMEs (see § 3.7). All experts had a similar level of ex-
pertise, each individually with over ten years of clinical
experience in their relevant fields, heads of large hospitals’
radiology departments; therefore, to obtain each value, we
computed a simple mean of their answers. Since the cur-
rent study focuses on the ontology-based Likelihood (L)
part of the TLDR methodology, we simplified this pro-
cess by using just the mean of the single-aspect severity
assessments of our RMEs for each attack. In a separate
paper, we discuss the severity Decomposition (D) part of
the TLDR methodology and its validation.
4.8. Computing the Composite Severity Assessments for
Each Attack
In the scope of the current study, this step is triv-
ial (see § 3.8), since we only have single-aspect severity;
thus, the composite severity assessments are simply the
single-aspect severity assessments from § 4.7.
4.9. Integrating the Likelihood and Severity of Each Attack
into Its Risk and Prioritizing It
Finally, in Table 2, we integrated the risk for each at-
tack by plugging into Equation (1) the CAPEC-based like-
lihood estimates (see § 4.5) and the composite severity as-
sessments (see § 4.8).
4.10. Validating the TLDR Methodology’s Results
We validated our results, following § 3.10, by following
the same steps as the TLDR methodology; however, we
asked the panel of healthcare ISEs to estimate also the di-
rect overall likelihood for each attack individually, instead
of using the TLDR methodology. We then defined two
“consensus” vectors of the 23 potential attacks: (1) the
Mean of the Experts’ CAPEC-Based Likelihood Estimates
(MECBLE) (computed indirectly), and (2) the Mean of
the Experts’ Direct-Likelihood Estimates (MEDLE). We
demonstrated that we maintained the validity of the risk
assessment process, by calculating the paired T -test statis-
tic between the CAPEC-based (MECBLE) estimates and
the direct ISEs’ estimates, and showing that the null hy-
pothesis is accepted (i.e., there was no significant difference
between them). In Table 4, we show that when we apply
a constant shift of the CAPEC-based likelihood estimates,
the results turn out to be significantly similar (the sec-
ond-row (b)). This is expected due to the different scales
that the two methods create.
Table 4: The paired T -test (P -value) results of the direct likelihood
estimates vs. (a) the CAPEC-based likelihood estimates; and (b) the
CAPEC-based likelihood estimates shifted by -0.13.
Likelihood Risk
(a) 5.756 (8.645 × 10−6 ) 6.026 (4.585 × 10−6 )
(b) 0.043 (0.966) -0.008 (0.994)
We demonstrated the value and the validity of using the
TLDR methodology with respect to the relative ranking of
the 23 potential threats, we calculated the pairwise Spear-
man’s correlation between the CAPEC-based (MECBLE)
likelihood estimates and the direct estimates of each of
our ISEs and showed that the correlation is high, while
the pairwise correlation between the mean of the direct
estimates (the MEDLE) and each of the ISEs’ overall di-
rect estimates was lower. Note that we asked the ISEs
to directly estimate the likelihood of each attack individ-
ually before we ask them to estimate it using the TLDR
methodology to eliminate a potential biased point of refer-
ence. In Table 5, we show that the healthcare ISEs seem to
agree with the MECBLE on the CAPEC-based likelihood
estimates, while two out of four ISEs did not agree with
the MEDLE on the estimates of the direct likelihood (im-
plying high variance between the correlations). Thus, we
can imply that the CAPEC-based (MECBLE) likelihood
estimates, using the TLDR methodology, are as valid as
current direct risk assessment methodologies’ likelihood es-
timates; however, the CAPEC-based likelihood estimates,
computed from the mapped CAPECs, are much easier to
calculate.
We also validated that the mapping of the discovered
attacks into their relevant CAPECs indeed results in a
mapping of many attacks into a significantly smaller num-
ber of just nine CAPECs. Also, we validated that using
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Table 5: Spearman’s pairwise correlation of the MECBLE and MEDLE with each of the ISEs’ estimates.
Spearman (P -value) MECBLE-ISE1 MECBLE-ISE2 MECBLE-ISE3 MECBLE-ISE4
Computed Likelihood 0.414 (0.050) 0.365 (0.087) 0.368 (0.084) -0.371 (0.082)
MEDLE-ISE1 MEDLE-ISE2 MEDLE-ISE3 MEDLE-ISE4
Direct Likelihood 0.271 (0.211) 0.837 (0.) 0.141 (0.521) 0.445 (0.033)
the AFDs helps discover new attacks, since we discovered
eight new attacks after using this method.
5. Summary
In this study, we have presented the TLDR methodol-
ogy for information security risk assessment for medical
devices, its application to MIDs and the validation of its
results correctness with the assistance of a panel of four se-
nior healthcare ISEs, CISOs of major HMOs, and a panel
of four senior RMEs, the heads of several large medical cen-
ters’ imaging departments. We first presented the essential
background on medical device security, information secu-
rity risk assessment methodologies, CAPEC mechanisms
of attacks, and MIDs. We have shown that nowadays, med-
ical devices are facing many security challenges; however,
it is difficult to accurately assess the risk of these challenges
using current risk assessment methodologies, which are too
general and do not seem to fit the unique medical domain.
The application of the TLDR methodology to MIDs in-
cluded: (1) identifying the potentially vulnerable compo-
nents of MIDs by creating four AFDs for the generic MID,
a generic CT, a generic MRI, and a generic ultrasound;
(2) identifying a total of 23 potential attacks on MIDs: 15
known attacks and eight new attacks that we discovered
using the AFDs; (3) mapping of all 23 discovered attacks
to just eight out of 517 existing CAPEC, and a new, 518th,
CAPEC attack pattern that we suggest adding; (4) esti-
mating the likelihood of the nine generic CAPECs with
the assistance of our panel of four senior healthcare ISEs
and using these estimates to compute the CAPEC-based
likelihood estimates of each attack; (5) computing, for all
medical device attacks, the composite severity assessments
of each attack with the assistance of a panel of four senior
RMEs; and (6) integrating the likelihood and severity of
each attack into its risk and prioritizing it.
We have shown that by using AFDs, we were able to
discover eight new potential attacks on MIDs, in addition
to the 15 known attacks. This implies that AFDs helps
discover new attacks and shows the importance of initially
identifying potentially vulnerable components.
We also validated that the mapping of the discovered at-
tacks into their relevant CAPECs indeed results in a map-
ping of many attacks into a significantly smaller number
of just nine CAPECs. Thus, it saves significant time and
effort and leads to greater consistency in risk assessment.
We have suggested adding CAPEC NEW, the new
CAPEC that we have defined, to the official CAPEC tax-
onomy since it may be relevant to other domains. It in-
volves the manipulation of environment hardware or sen-
sors as part of the attack pattern. Other potentially rele-
vant domains might include operational technology or crit-
ical infrastructure domains that use devices that rely on
such environment hardware or sensors.
6. Discussion
The analysis of the pairwise Spearman’s correlation be-
tween the CAPEC-based (MECBLE) likelihood estimates
and the direct estimates of each of our ISEs, had shown
that the ISEs strongly agree with the MECBLE using the
TLDR methodology while disagreeing with the mean of
the direct estimates (the MEDLE). This shows that it is
much easier for ISEs to reach a consensus when using the
TLDR methodology. In fact, when the ISEs were asked
to estimate the likelihood directly, they could not reach a
consensus.
Moreover, we demonstrate, at least statistically, that by
systematically decomposing and mapping the attacks into
their relevant CAPEC standard attack patterns and esti-
mating the likelihood of just these CAPECs with a panel
of healthcare ISEs, we can reasonably accurately compute
the likelihood estimates of all attacks; the CAPEC-based
likelihood and risk correlated well with our panel of health-
care ISEs’ direct individual attack estimates of the likeli-
hood.
We have also shown that such ontology-based map-
ping of attacks is beneficial to the analysis of attacks
on MIDs. The mapping of discovered attacks into a set
of existing CAPECs enables us to exploit repeatedly the
one-time likelihood estimates of these CAPECs in the
medical (here, radiology) domain, and in some cases, even
the default CAPECs likelihood estimates, to compute the
CAPEC-based likelihood estimates of the new potential
attacks. Unfortunately, not all of the mapped CAPECs
that we found include a likelihood estimate in the official
CAPEC ontology, thus we can use for now our CAPECs
likelihood estimates instead, and perhaps update these es-
timates in the future, once the CAPEC ontology is up-
dated.
The overall enumeration and charting, mapping into
CAPECs, likelihood estimates, severity assessments, and
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overall risk integration, as defined in the TLDR method-
ology (§ 3), is potentially relevant to many other medical
domains and devices, its application to MIDs in this study
was given as a use case example. Such mapping could
likely be beneficial to other medical devices as well since
we did not base it on any MID-specific aspects.
Using the TLDR methodology implies that ISEs are
used only for the qualitative phase of mapping potential
attacks to CAPECs. Note that in most cases, mapping
attacks to CAPECs is straightforward, and may be per-
formed by a less experienced ISE. Once this relatively sim-
ple task is performed, we use the predefined likelihoods of
the respective CAPECs. There is no need to ask the panel
of ISEs for the quantitative estimates again.
7. Limitations
We used only four senior ISEs to directly estimate the
likelihood of each of the 23 potential attacks, as well as the
likelihood of the nine CAPECs into which these attacks
were mapped. It is possible that using even more ISEs
might modify the results, although the fact that even with
four ISEs, it was possible to reach a reasonable [mean]
consensus, seems to indicate that using a higher number
is likely to further strengthen the results.
We applied the full TLDR methodology only to the ra-
diology domain and to MIDs. Applying the methodology
to other medical domains and additional medical devices
in a future study is quite possible as well, to show that the
TLDR methodology is useful in other medical domains and
devices.
8. Conclusions
From the AFD of the generic MID, we can conclude
that many high-risk attacks could be targeting it; thus,
potentially affecting many MIDs. The host control PC,
connected to the MIDs and the Internet (via hospital
networks), is particularly vulnerable, poses many threats
(e.g., sabotage, physical harm to patients), and is the most
apparent initial entry point for attackers. The CT device
itself is also very vulnerable and is potentially exposed to
additional attacks that may cause direct harm to patients
due to the use of ionizing X-ray radiation.
From our prioritization of risks, we can conclude that
a ransomware attack (attack 1) poses the highest risk for
a generic MID and the overall highest risk attack of all
MIDs, followed by a disruption of patient-to-image linkage
attack (attack 2) and an alteration of the imaging exam’s
results attack (attack 3). Furthermore, a radiation over-
dose attack (attack 14) poses the highest risk for a generic
CT and an overwhelm of the MRI’s receiving coils with an
overpowered magnetic field attack (attack 19) poses the
highest risk for a generic MRI.
This work reinforces our understanding that in order
to better protect medical devices, it is necessary to start
by correctly prioritizing the protection efforts through
a consistent and accurate information security risk as-
sessment of the potential threats, such as by using the
TLDR methodology that we had proposed in this pa-
per. Then, further research and development of detec-
tion and prevention techniques against attacks must be
performed. Such techniques should be implemented both
outside (e.g., through hospital networks) and inside med-
ical devices ecosystems since each device can consist of
an entire ecosystem of components, all of which must be
better secured.
We hope that our work contributes to a better risk as-
sessment of the risk to medical devices posed by cyber
security threats. We consider it potentially valuable for
researchers, healthcare organizations, hospitals, medical
device manufacturers, and ISEs, leading to a prioritized
assessment of the potential risks, followed by research and
development of new defensive mechanisms. Indeed, we
have already begun investigating several such means for
mitigation of the potential attacks that we had discovered.
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Appendix A. WannaCry
The WannaCry crypto-worm [2–4], which emerged in
May 2017, is a worldwide ransomware cyber attack that
infected over 200,000 devices in more than 150 nations [5],
with a significant impact on the FedEx delivery company’s
services in the USA, Spanish telecom and gas companies,
Renault car production factories in France, Russia’s inte-
rior ministry, and the NHS [6] of the UK. This was the
first, large-scale cyber attack that affected the healthcare
industry directly by infecting tens of thousands of NHS
hospitals’ devices, including MIDs such as MRIs, accord-
ing to the Sunday Times [7] reports, causing them to be
non-operational by encrypting them. This attack caused
several hospitals to turn away patients [8, 9] and divert
ambulance routes [10].
The WannaCry attack was based on the Eternal-
Blue exploit, a Windows SMB27 protocol exploit tool
(CVE-2017-014428 [76]), which affected many Windows
versions such as Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008,
Windows 7, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012, Win-
dows RT 8.1, Windows 10, and Windows Server 2016. It
was leaked in April 2017 by the Shadow Brokers hacker
group, among several other exploits believed to belong to
the NSA29. The exploit allows arbitrary code execution by
remote attackers via crafted packets. Although in March
2017 (before the exploit was leaked) Microsoft issued a
critical security patch fixing the exploit [76], many com-
puters were still vulnerable, because they had not been
regularly updated for various reasons (e.g., technical is-
sues, strict regulations, or insufficient awareness), as was
the case with the NHS medical devices and computers.
The WannaCry crypto-worm was eventually contained
due to the discovery of a software kill switch [77] (i.e., a
unique code that was inserted by the attacker to allow the
malware execution to be stopped). In this case, the kill
switch was a particular URL30 used by the malware to
track activity from infected machines. This domain was
found to act as a kill switch that shuts down the software
before it executed its payload, stopping the spread of the
ransomware. Some believe that this was inserted by the
attackers to prevent the malware from running on quaran-
tined machines and sandbox environments used by AV31
researchers [78]. Such environments, respond to all queries
from the machine with some traffic in order to trick the
suspicious software into “thinking” that it is still connected
to the Internet; hence, when the WannaCry attempts to
contact the discovered URL, which does not actually ex-
ist and receives an answer, it means that the ransomware
is running in a sandbox environment (i.e., receiving traffic
from a nonexistent URL) and therefore should do nothing,
to evade detection by AV researchers. When discovered,
some hackers even tried using a Mirai botnet variant to
create a distributed attack on this domain (i.e., the Wan-
naCry’s kill switch), intending to shut it down and reignite
the attack [79].
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CAPEC Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and
Classification 1, 3–6, 9, 10, 18–21, 24
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27Server Message Block
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DR digital radiography 6
EMR electronic medical record 12, 15
FDA Food and Drug Administration 4–6
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IFV Information Flow Vector 7, 8, 12, 13, 15
IRS Image Reconstruction System 11, 13, 14, 17
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hood Estimates 3, 10, 19, 20
MEDLE Mean of the Experts’ Direct-Likelihood Esti-
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PACS picture archiving and communication system 12,
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PET positron-emission tomography 6, 7
RF radio frequency 6, 7, 11, 13, 14, 16–18
RME Radiology Medical Expert 10, 19–21
SPECT single-photon emission computed tomography 6,
7
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severity Decomposition, and Risk integration 1, 3, 4,
7–11, 18–21
VPN virtual private network 12, 13
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